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1. Introduction
In this paper I investigate the phenomenon of unsolicited reason-giving which often occurs in everyday conversation.
Specifically, I draw upon data from an anonymous public-opinion survey conducted over the telephone in which
respondents give reasons for their answers even though such elaboration is discouraged and will not be recorded on
the survey. This data provides an opportunity to investigate reason-giving in unplanned adult discourse within the
scope of personal opinion. I ask two particular questions of this reason-giving: 1) In what contexts do respondents
provide unsolicited reasons for their answers, that is, what kind of questions most often result in reason-giving; and 2)
What kind of reasons do respondents provide. In addition, I ask the broader question of why people give reasons at
all. The results suggest that the first two questions can be answered by considering personal opinion as an argument
field, with its own preferred type of justifications and warrants. I address the second, broader question of why people
give reasons at all by interpreting the reason-giving shown here as critical thinking. In conclusion I suggest that a close
look at this unsolicited reason-giving demonstrates with Alvin Goldman’s idea of personal justification (P-justification)
(Goldman, 1997). The idea of P-justification provides a bridge to work in rhetorical theory, which calls for
"humanness" as a necessary condition for effective communication. This leads me to suggest that reason-giving in the
opinion-poll interviews serves as a way for respondents to present themselves as human and thoughtfully reasonable
rather than as a strategy to argue for their claims.
2. The Texas Poll
The data used in this study comes from the Texas Poll, an anonymous public-opinion poll, is conducted quarterly
under the sponsorship of Harte-Hanks Communication. Each quarter’s survey includes questions asked by the Texas
A&M University Public Policy Resources Laboratory (affiliated with the political science department), which
conducts the poll. The answers to these questions are syndicated to the press. In addition, the survey asks questions
for public agencies and academic researchers, who pay to have their questions included and for statistical analyses of
the answers. Commercial business such as marketing research is not accepted. Respondents each quarter are 1,000
residents of Texas, selected by means of a random telephone "digit sampling frame." Interviewers are trained and paid
by the Public Policy Resources Laboratory. Most interviewers are female college students around 20 years old and
most are from middle to upper-middle class urban or suburban families. No attempt is made to match interviewers
and respondents demographically, except when a respondent requests to be interviewed in Spanish; the bilingual
interviewers are Hispanic Americans.
Like other such surveys, the Texas Poll is a standardized, scheduled interview (all respondents are meant to answer
the same questions, and the wording and order of the questions is specified), which includes both open-ended and
fixed-alternative (multiple-choice) questions. Interviews are structured around a schedule of questions that combines
elements of a flow chart with elements of a script.
Questions are asked in topical sets. In the survey I use here, questions include, for example, a set about how various
public officials are performing, a set about skin cancer, a set about the supercollider which was then planned for
construction in Texas, and a set about abortion. The questionnaire prescribes exact wording for the introductory
portion of the interview and for each question, as well as for topic shifts between sets of questions ("On a different
topic;" "On another subject;" "Now we want to ask you a question about families"). If it starts promptly and if nothing
occurs except for question-asking and answering, and interview lasts about 20 minutes. Not all are that short,

occurs except for question-asking and answering, and interview lasts about 20 minutes. Not all are that short,
however. The tapes on which the interviews were recorded lasted 45 minutes, and some interviews were longer than
that.
For this analysis 36 interviews were taped and transcribed from the January, 1989 run of the poll. These were
chosen, for the purposes of another project, to include at least one interview from each of the 24 interviewers who
conducted the survey as well as seven additional interviews by one of the female interviewers and five additional
interviews by one of the male interviewers. There are of course 36 different respondents, since no one was
interviewed twice. All the respondents in our sample are Anglo-American residents of Texas; they include men and
women and people of a variety of ages and income and education levels. The number of unsolicited reasons in each
interview ranged from none to 20.1
3. Contexts for Unsolicited Reasons
The first step in analyzing the data was to categorize the types of questions asked in the survey. In order to
categorize, I determined the kind of claim, either factual, policy, or value that the question was asking the respondent
to make. This proceeded from the thought that perhaps certain types of claims elicited more justification than others.
Factual questions asked for some sort of objective information, either personal or impersonal. For example, a
personal factual claim question is, "Do you regularly use a tanning booth or a sun lamp to work on your tan?" An
impersonal factual claim question asks the respondent to give some fact on a topic other than themselves: "What do
you think the most important issues are with respect to nuclear power? "A policy question required respondents to
advocate a course of public policy: "Would you agree or disagree with a law that would require a one week waiting
period before a hand gun could be purchased?" A value question asked the respondent to judge the goodness of
something: "How would you rate the job George Bush has done since the election-excellent, good, only fair, or
poor?" Overall, there were 88 factual questions (50 personal and 38 impersonal), 17 policy questions, and 5 value
questions, for a total of 110 questions in the survey.
As Table 1 shows [see Table 1], the 36 surveys included a total of 3,960 questions, of which 174, or 4.4%, received
answers that included unsolicited reasons. Fact and value answers were answered with reasons at roughly the same
rate: 4.0% of the impersonal fact answers and 3.4% of personal fact answers had unsolicited reasons, and 4.9% of
the value answers had unsolicited reasons. Answers to policy questions, however, included unsolicited reasons at
over three times this rate: 13.8% of the policy answers included unsolicited reasons.
4. Types of Unsolicited Reasons
The next step in the analysis was to look at the type of reasons used by the respondents. In a previous study of
reason-giving in which people were asked to convince an imaginary hostage-taker to release hostages, Rieke (1981)
found that adults in this situation appealed mostly to authority, social pressure, threats, moral obligation and switching
the burden. He suggested that the prominence of these types of reasons are more or less typical of supplicatory
reasoning. In addition he found other types of reasons which were not used as often: analogy, alternatives, closure
attempts and self interest. In my own investigation, I began with Rieke’s categories and then studied half of the
reasons given by the respondents in order to develop more categories. Other common types of reasons that evolved
into categories were sentiment, belief, personal fact, and impersonal fact. An example of an appeal to sentiment is
"Uh, I'd just have to say fair since I'm not real wild about him," in response to the value question of how Bill Clements
was doing as governor of Texas. The reason this respondent gives for making the claim "fair" is because she is "not
real wild about him." In contrast, one respondent answered the question about how George Bush was doing in office
by stating that "He just got elected, so, uh, I guess good." This respondent draws upon an impersonal fact, "he just
got elected" as grounds for his claim that Bush is doing a good job. Some appeals were to beliefs, as when one
respondent said "I don't believe in abortion," when asked about the circumstances under which abortion should be

respondent said "I don't believe in abortion," when asked about the circumstances under which abortion should be
legal. Table 2 [see Table 2] lays out what was found.
Two observations stand out on the basis of this analysis: 1) Personal fact is the most common mode of appeal in the
unsolicited reasons. People say things about themselves, in other words, to explain why they are answering as they
are. This is particularly the case when people are asked about themselves: when people are asked about facts about
themselves, they give reasons for their answers involving other facts about themselves. Twenty-three of the 174
reasons we studied were of this kind. For example:
Interviewer: We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days.
Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or
worse off than a year ago?
since I’m retired and drawing a social security check, I guess I’m in the
Respondent:
uh-the same.
Here, the respondent justifies his claim, of "same," with the personal fact that he is "retired and drawing a social
security check." People also appeal to facts about themselves in other contexts, when giving answers that make
claims about impersonal facts, values, and, to a lesser extent, policy. 2) Although, as noted, people relatively often
give reasons related to their own authority, rooted in their own experience, appeals to authority other than the
authority of the speaker him- or herself are rare in this corpus, no matter what type of claim is called for. Also
relatively rare overall are appeals to value though it should be noted that appeals to value would be unlikely in
connection with claims about facts in any case (arguing about what is true on the basis of what should be true
apparently seems fallacious to people), and most of the questions required claims about facts.
A final category that evolved is what I call meta-thinking. This category differs from the others in that it is not an
appeal in order to justify an answer. Rather, with the reasoning displayed in these instances the respondent mitigates a
claim or reflects upon his or her own thinking process or knowledge state, or on the question itself. For example, one
respondent said "I'm too uneducated to tell you" in response to a question about nuclear energy. At times metathinking accompanied the other kinds of appeals. We divided the meta-thinking category into four subcategories: 1)
qualifiers, when respondents used words such as, "I guess..." that mitigate the knowledge claim being made, 2) selfreflection, when respondents made comments about themselves; 3) comment on question, when respondents directly
commented on the question; and 4) don't know, when the respondents talked about why they didn’t know the
answer. Table 3 [see Table 3] shows what was found.
As the table shows, meta-thinking of all kinds is most common in responses to questions that ask the respondents to
make factual claims about things other than themselves. Whether people do or don't know the answers to such
questions, they are more likely to think aloud about the questions and their state of knowledge in this context than
when they are asked about themselves or asked to make value or policy claims. This may have to do with the fact
that the evidentiary stakes are highest in responses to impersonal factual questions: you can be wrong about answers
to questions like these in a way you can't be wrong in your answers to questions about yourself or about what is good
or bad or what policies should be adopted. This could explain the increased use of qualifiers in this setting, as people
try to lower the stakes somewhat by mitigating their claims.
5. Discussion: Reasons for Reasons
This study gives rise to the following observations about unsolicited reason-giving in an anonymous public-opinion
survey:
1. People give reasons for claims even when they are discouraged from doing so and when it is not obvious what
purpose it serves in the activity.

purpose it serves in the activity.
2. The survey respondents give reasons for policy claims three times as frequently as they give reasons for value or
factual claims.
3. In the reasons overall, respondents appeal to their personal experience, not to external authority.
4. Respondents talk about their thought processes, especially when the evidentiary stakes are high.
In light of these observations I would like to return to my original questions: 1) In what contexts do respondents
provide unsolicited reasons for their answers; 2) What kind of reasons do respondents provide; and 3) Why do
people give unsolicited reasons at all in this context?
In answer to the first two questions we have seen that survey respondents most often give reasons for policy claims
and appeal to personal experience over other types of justifications. These observations build upon previous studies
of reason-giving in specific argument fields. In his 1981 study of argument fields Rieke concluded that the data of this
study suggest that reasoning is field specific and further studies in other fields or situations of reasoning is suggested in
order to understand better how reasoning is organized into fields, populations, communities, and forums.(p. 590)
Rieke and Willbrand’s (1981) study of supplication in children and adults showed that children often demonstrate
adult strategies in supplication but do not use self-interest as often as adults. Their study also supported the idea that
reasoning differs from field to field and in planned and unplanned discourse. In the Texas Poll Survey that asks
individuals their opinions, respondents drew most on personal facts as reasons. Also unlike the previous study, in this
situation authority was one of the least used reasons, while in supplication it was heavily used. In addition, values or
morals were much used in supplication and seldom used in the survey, except in the case of policy claims. These
differences in types of reasons used in supplication and in the opinion poll support Toulmin’s concept of an argument
field, defined by different purposes and therefore entailing different argumentative strategies. This study also suggests
that different claims, within the same field, may call for different strategies and types of reasons.
Now by considering the reason-giving performed by the respondents, I would like to address the broader question of
why people give unsolicited reasons in this public-opinion survey. I will not attempt to investigate all possible reasons
for the reason-giving behavior identified in this data. Such possibilities include efforts at politeness so that their short
answers do not sound brusque (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Another very practical factor could be time-filling while
the respondents are thinking of their answer. Pauses in conversation can often be interpreted as a signal to change
turns (Sacks et al. 1974) or they are perceived as awkward. Preventing negative connotations might also be a
motivation for reason giving. For example, when asked "Do you think your family will be worse off next year?" An
affirmative might suggest a loss of job or some other negative connotation, but when a reason is given, "I’ll have two
kids in college," the force of such negative connotations is mitigated. Finally, there is the idiosyncratic factor. Some
individuals may simply have the habit of being more talkative and explaining everything, but a comparison of styles of
individual reason-giving of these respondents is beyond the scope of this paper
I would like to suggest that these acts of reason-giving are instances of critical thinking. Rieke and Sillars (1997)
describe critical thinking as "a mini-debate you carry on with yourself" (p. 9). They differentiate it from argumentation
by the fact that it is internal and personal, rather than an external and public action: "While argumentation is a social
process (audience-centered), it involves engaging individuals in making up their minds on how to act through
communication with other people."(p. 8). In other words, argumentation can be both a social and an individual
process. Others in informal logic and critical thinking characterize it as the justification of beliefs or reflective thought
(Eemeren, et al., p. 165). Of particular interest to informal logicians has been Fisher’s (1988) "‘Assertability
Question’: What argument of evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusion C?" (p. 131). Further, Siegel

Question’: What argument of evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusion C?" (p. 131). Further, Siegel
(1998) defines a critical thinker as one who "must be able to assess reasons and their ability to warrant beliefs, claims
and actions properly" (p. 34). The reason-giving expressed by the respondents of this survey can be read as efforts to
assess the reasons they have to warrant a claim:
(1) Texas has been chosen as a site of the supercollider. Have you ever
Interviewer: heard anything about the supercollider?
Respondent: It’s something about atoms. (1) Yeah, I’ve heard a little bit.
(2) [Do you] strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree [that]
Interviewer: nuclear power plants lead to higher electric bills?
Respondent: (3) What’s the one between agree and strongly disagree?
Interviewer: disagree
um, Just plain old disagree. Uh, mmm (4) I agree. I guess you have to
Respondent:
pay for it, so I guess it would bring your electricity bill up.
How serious do you think sunburns are in increasing the future risk of
(3)
skin cancer for children? Very serious, somewhat serious, not very
Interviewer:
serious, or not serious at all?
Uhh, maybe not as much as adul-Well, I guess I’d have to say serious
Respondent:
since they would uh (2)
Interviewer: ok
Because it can develop over time. They’re not going to happen
Respondent:
overnight.
In these examples the respondents seem to be searching for what evidence they have in order to justify a claim. In this
sense these instances of reason-giving can be viewed as moments of critical thinking aloud in which the respondents
articulate their thinking process in coming to a claim.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to point out a relationship I see between the results of this study, that personal opinion
might be considered an argument field and reason-giving in unplanned discourse as an act of critical thinking, and
Alvin Goldman’s discussion of P-justification in his article "Argumentation and Interpersonal Justification" (1997). In
this article he maintains that "there is such a thing as personal justification (P-justification), which is an individual
matter, and that a cognitive agent can be personally justified (P-justified) in believing a proposition without having any
relevant justificational relation to other people."(p. 156). Further, he states, "in saying...that there is a core nonsocial
notion of justification, I mean that a belief can be justified in virtue of such condition as the believer’s perceptual
experiences and/or prior beliefs, rather than his/her relations to other thinkers" (p. 156). Thus, for Goldman all
justification is based on personal justification, that first, one must be personally convinced of claim before one can
convince someone else.
If we think of a person’s justification as a matter of the evidence possessed by the person, and if evidence-possession
consists of the person’s having certain beliefs and/or perceptual experience, then we have a personal interpretation of
the justification condition, an interpretation that readily comports with the assumption that one person might be
justified in believing a given argument’s premises while another person might not be so justified. (p. 160)
The heavy reliance on personal experience found in this survey data supports Goldman’s claim that people must be
personally justified in holding a belief and that for different people, the acceptability of reasons for making claims will
be different. In this survey, many people gave reasons for their answer to the question, "How would you rate the job

be different. In this survey, many people gave reasons for their answer to the question, "How would you rate the job
George Bush has done since the election--excellent, good, only fair, or poor?" Here are four different responses to
this question:
(1)
It’s only a couple of days. Can’t tell.
Respondent:
(2)
Well I would say only fair because he hasn’t really done anything yet.
Respondent:
(3) Well he hasn’t been there very long. I don’t know. Can’t comment on
Respondent: that. He’s only been in office one day.
Interviewer: so you don’t know?
Respondent: No
Interviewer: ok
Respondent: He hasn’t made it...committed himself yet.
(4)
Well, he just got elected, so uh, I guess good?
Respondent:
From these answers it is obvious these surveys took place soon after George Bush entered office. Given this fact
which all four of the respondents cite, two say they don’t know or can’t comment, one answers "fair" and another
answers "good." Using the same evidence these respondents make different claims. We can surmise here that their
warrants are different for these different individuals, which highlights the very personal nature of justification.
Finally, I’d like to point to the relationship I see between the fundamentally personal nature of justification which
Goldman discusses and which our study supports and the idea of ethos in rhetorical theory. One of the criteria of
ethos which has been discussed (Kaufer & Butler, 1996) is to "be human," to be an individual person who thinks
consistently. I’d like to suggest, in light of the human characteristic of ethos, that another explanation of why people
give unsolicited reasons in the public-opinion survey, in addition to thinking aloud in order to come to a claim, is an
effort to present themselves as persons, not machines, with individual, unique reasons for their opinions when
expressed, which in turn provides an opportunity for interpersonal justification. The goal of giving reasons here is not
so much to persuade the interviewer of the validity of the claim. Rather, I think the respondents are trying to
persuade the interviewer that they are justified in their opinions by having the interviewer understand their personal
reasoning.

Endnotes
1This sample, though not designed with this project in mind, is unlikely to favor either people who give especially
many reasons or people who give especially few. A study that compared reason-giving across demographic groups,
or that made claims about the frequency or the characteristics of reason-giving among human beings as a whole,
would have to be based on a more systematically representative sample. But since the goal here is simply to show
that reason-giving occurs in a situation in which it might not be expected, to make some observations about when it
occurs and what it is like, and to suggest some reasons for it, this sample is adequate.

Table 1: Percentage of answers including unsolicited reasons by type of claim required.

Type of claim
required by question

Total answers to
questions of this type
in the 36 interviews

Number of answers
including unsolicited
reasons

Percentage of
answers including
unsolicited reasons

Impersonal Fact

1800

72

4.0

Personal Fact

1368

47

3.4

Value

612

30

4.9

Policy

180

25

13.8

TOTAL

3960

174

4.4

Table 1

Table 2: Types of appeals used to justify claims.
Type of claim
required by
question:

Personal fact

Impersonal
fact

Value

Policy

TOTAL

sentiment

5

6

3

3

17

personal fact

23

8

6

2

39

impersonal
fact

0

5

4

7

16

value

0

1

3

4

8

authority

0

0

1

2

3

alternatives

4

3

1

5

13

analogy

8

0

1

2

11

TOTAL

41

40

25

30

146

Type of
appeal used
in reason:

Table 2

Table 3: Types of meta-thinking corresponding to types of claims.

Type of claim
required by
question

Personal Fact

Impersonal
Fact

Value

Policy

Total

qualifier

5

19

5

3

33

self-reflection

0

18

4

1

23

reflection on
question

0

4

2

2

8

don’t know

0

16

9

5

30

Type of
Metathinking

Table 3
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